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INTRODUCTION
The oil shocks of the 1970s propelled the search for alternative
fuel sources by oil-dependent but petroleum-poor countries. Renewable
energy programs, energy conservation plans, nuclear power, natural gas,
and coal projects all flourished. Environmental concerns over air quality
in large cities, and the significant role motor- vehicle emissions played in
creating urban air pollution, generated interest in alternative energy. The
United States and Brazil—then the two largest producers and consumers
of ethanol in the world—focused intensely on biofuels as a substitute for
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oil,1 whilst other countries—such as Japan and European Union
members—focused more on nuclear energy and other methods of power
generation.2 This state of affairs remained until the 1980s, when oil
prices dropped significantly, causing a temporary loss of interest in
petroleum substitutes. However, from the 1980s onward, climate change
emerged as a significant concern. The 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change3 symbolized the international consensus
about the need to address climate change, and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol4
was the first concrete international effort in that direction.5 This new
focus on climate change revived the discussion about the need for
alternative energy sources. In addition, during the 2000s, oil prices
spiked anew; they went from less than US$30 to more than US$70 per
barrel.6 Political and social instability in areas of oil abundance,
combined with the widespread belief that oil extraction would peak in
ten or twenty years and then decline, contributed to this price volatility.7

1

2

3

4

5

6
7

See Mark S. Langevin, Renewable Cooperation? Reflections on United States-Brazil
Cooperation
on
Biofuels,
AM.
DIPL.
(Nov.
2008),
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/1012/comm/langevin_biofeul.html.
Rogério Cezar de Cerqueira Leite & Manoel Régis L. V. Leal, O biocombustível No Brasil, 78
NOVOS
ESTUDOS
CEBRAP
15
(2007),
available
at
http://www.agencia.cnptia.embrapa.br/Repositorio/03_000fxggj1i702wyiv80soht9h0kawrk0.pdf.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, 165, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Pt. II)/Add.1, 31I.L.M.849 (1992).
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 I.L.M
22 (1998), Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1.
See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, UNITED
NATIONS
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php.
Leite & Leal, supra note 2.
Id.
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Cushing, OK
K Crude Oil Future Contract 1 (Dollars per Barrel)
Decade Year0
1980s
1990s 24.50
2000s 30.26
2010s 79.61

Year- Year- Year1
2
3
30.66
21.50 20.58 18.48
25.95 26.15 30.99
95.11

Year4
29.44
17.19
41.47

Year5
27.89
18.40
56.70

Year6
15.05
22.03
66.25

Year7
19.15
20.61
72.41

Year8
15.96
14.40
99.75

Year9
19.58
19.30
62.09

- = No Data Reported
ted;—= Not Applicable; NA = Not Available; W =
Withheld to avoid dis
disclosure of individual company data.
Release Date: 1/19/20
/2012
Next Release Date:: 11/25/2012
Biofuels, whhich are fuels made from biomass materials8 that are
re
usually blended with
ith fossil fuels—gasoline and diesel—emerged into
to
this turbulent landsca
scape, offering the promise of partially or completely
ly
supplanting fossil fue
fuels. However, they can also be used on their own for
or
transportation or ener
nergy generation.9
This articlee w
will focus on the Brazilian experience using ethanol
ol
as a substitute for ga
gasoline for motor-vehicle fuel. Part I offers a brief
ief
discussion of the nnature and role of biofuels. Part II details the
he
development of ethan
anol regulation in Brazil, from its inception during the
he
era of military dicta
ctatorship through the present. Part III discusses the
he
environmental issues
es and criticisms concerning ethanol production and
nd
8

9

Biofuels: Ethanol and B
Biodiesel Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (March 19, 2012),
2),
http://www.eia.gov/energ
ergyexplained/index.cfm?page=biofuel_home.
Id.
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how they apply to the Brazilian model. Part IV analyzes the Brazilian
experience and explains why it would be very difficult or impossible to
replicate in the United States. Overall, this article portrays the difficulties
and challenges the United States will face in trying to follow the
Brazilian model.
I. BIOFUELS: NATURE AND ROLE
Presently, the most commonly used biofuels are biodiesel and
ethanol. Biodiesel is a renewable fuel produced from agricultural
resources such as vegetable oils—including soybean, canola, and
sunflower—as well as recycled cooking oils and animal fats.10 Biodiesel
can be used in any diesel engine; no adaptations are necessary.11 Ethanol,
on the other hand, is a renewable fuel made from plants. Ethanol is
produced by fermenting plant sugars from corn, sugar cane, and other
starchy agricultural products, as well as cellulosic materials in
agricultural wastes (e.g., waste woods and corn stalks).12 Ethanol can be
mixed with gasoline and mass-marketed. Indeed, any gasoline-powered
engine manufactured after 1980 in the United States can run on a blend
of 90 percent gasoline and 10 percent ethanol (“E10”). However, only
flex-fuel vehicles (which are not widely available in the United States)
can operate with a blend of gasoline containing more than 10 percent
ethanol.13 In principle, biofuels have a lighter environmental footprint
than fossil fuels. Plants absorb carbon dioxide from the air as they grow.
As a result, the carbon dioxide released from biofuel combustion does
not represent a net addition of greenhouse gases released to the
atmosphere.14 Biofuels also burn cleaner than fossil fuels because they
are created from nontoxic and biodegradable substances.15
Thus, there are both economic and environmental reasons why
incentivizing the production and consumption of these fuels seem an

10

11
12
13
14

15

EPA Technical Highlights: Biofuels, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), at 1, available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420f10009.pdf.
Biofuels: Ethanol and Biodiesel Explained, supra note 8.
EPA Technical Highlights: Biofuels, supra note 10.
Biofuels: Ethanol and Biodiesel Explained, supra note 8.
ARTHUR RODRIGUES, ETANOL: ASPECTOS JURIDICOS, ECONOMICOS E INTERNACIONAIS 16
(2011).
See Biodiesel and the Environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (March 19, 2012);
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=biofuel_biodiesel_environment; Ethanol
and
the
Environment,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (March
19,
2012),
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=biofuel_ethanol _environment.
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appealing policy choice for countries. On the economic front, biofuels
could potentially diminish dependence on oil imports, offer more
security in the continuity of oil supply, and improve the balance of
trade.16 In the environmental realm, biofuels could help minimize air
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.17 However, as production and
use of biofuels have mushroomed, the sought-after environmental
economic benefits have been elusive.18 For example, because planting,
harvesting, transporting, fertilizing, and converting biomass into fuels
requires energy (much of which derives from fossil-sources), calculating
the carbon footprint of biofuels has proven to be a complex endeavor.19
Indeed, some argue that biofuels offer no improvement at all over fossil
fuels.20 In addition, burning ethanol may increase airborne concentrations
of formaldehyde and acetaldehyde into the air, thus increasing local
pollution and health risks.21 Finally, rising food prices and the
undesirable expansions of agriculture into conservation areas are possible
results of the growing pressure to produce ever-increasing volumes of
biofuels.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHANOL REGULATION IN BRAZIL
The first official policy adopted by the Brazilian government to
incentivize the nation’s production and consumption of ethanol was
Proalcool (National Ethanol Program). It was launched in 1975 by
Decree n. 76.593, mandating the addition of ethanol to gasoline for use
in motor vehicles.22 There was no fixed percentage for the blend. Rather,
Petrobras (Petroleo Brasil S/A)—a federally owned company that held a
monopoly on oil exploitation, production, refinement, and transportation
in Brazil until 1997—was directed to buy ethanol and add it to gasoline.23
The federal government awarded financial incentives to companies
16

17
18
19
20
21

22

23

Economics
of
Biofuels,
EPA
(Aug.
20,
2012),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/Biofuels.html.
Leite & Leal, supra note 2.
D.A. Walker, Biofuels – For Better or Worse?, 156 ANNALS OF APPLIED BIOLOGY 319 (2010).
RODRIGUES, supra note 14.
Walker, supra note 18, at 319 – 20.
Mark Shwartz, Ethanol Vehicles Pose Significant Risk to Health, New Study Finds, STANFORD
U. NEWS (Apr. 18, 2007), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/april18/ethanol-041807.html.
Decreto No. 76.593, de 14 de Novembro de 1975, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 7
(Braz.).
Lei No. 9.478/97, de 7 de Agosto de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 06.08.1997
(Braz.).
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producing ethanol in order to guarantee that ethanol supply would meet
the demand generated by the program.24
The Yom Kippur War of 1973 had a devastating impact on oil
25
prices. The price of oil jumped from US$2 to US$12 per barrel in
1973,26 causing an international crisis known as the first oil shock.27 The
crisis deeply affected the Brazilian economy, which at the time imported
80 percent of its oil.28 The Brazilian government—then a military
dictatorship29—felt compelled to remedy the country’s widely off-kilter
balance of trade and help bring inflation under control.30 The government
was determined to invest in and develop renewable energy sources.31 Of
the options discussed—diesel oil, coal and ethanol32—ethanol presented
the most promise and garnered the most support.33 Proalcool was put into
place by presidential decree in 1975.34 It promised to diminish Brazil’s
dependence on foreign oil, aid national economic and scientific
development, and generate employment and income.35 Following the
creation of Proalcool, ethanol regulation and development in Brazil can
be divided into four phases.36
A. FIRST PHASE: 1975–1979
During the first phase, Brazil’s focus was on producing
anhydrous ethanol to be blended with gasoline.37 The aim was to reduce

24

25

26
27

28

29

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Decreto No. 76.593, de 14 de Novembro de 1975, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: arts. 5,6
(Braz.).
Ednaldo Michellon et al., Breve Descrição do Proálcool e Perspectivas Futuras para o Etanol
Produzido no Brasil, XLVI CONGRESSO DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA,
ADMINISTRAÇÃO E SOCIOLOGIA RURAL (Rio Branco — Acre, Julho 20 – 23, 2008) available at
http://www.sober.org.br/palestra/9/574.pdf.
Id.
Euclid A. Rose, OPEC’s Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World’s
Dependence on Oil, 58 THE MIDDLE E. J. 424 (2004).
Pery F. A. Shikida & Carlos José C. Bacha, Evolução da Agroindústria Canavieira Brasileira de
1975 a 1995, 53 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA, RIO DE JANEIRO 69, 70 (1999).
Brazil was under a military dictatorship from 1964 until 1985, when a peaceful transition was
made to a civilian democratic government.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
Id.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
Id.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 73.
See Michellon et al., supra note 25.
Id.
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petroleum imports and, thereby, the ballooning trade deficit.38 Brazil had
spent US$8.36 billion on oil imports between 1974 and 1976, while
spending only US$1.4 billion between 1972 and 1974.39 Proalcool’s
initial goal was to produce 3 billion liters of ethanol by 1980, up from
less than a billion liters per year in 1975.40
The government boosted ethanol production by offering loans
and subsidies to the energy sector.41 It also determined that Petrobras
would buy a minimum annual volume of ethanol,42 as well as transport,
distribute, and blend it with gasoline.43 The government would set the
price of ethanol through the Instituto do Acucar e Alcool (IAA)—an
agency tasked with regulating the sugar and ethanol sector, defining
export quotas, and subsidizing the industry.44 Decree n. 80.762/77
(adopted in 1977) superseded the 1975 Decree and established parity
between ethanol and sugar prices.45 During the following ten years,
US$16 billion was invested in genetic research to improve sugar cane
yield, subsidize the ethanol sector, and underwrite low-interest financing
for new agricultural machinery.46
Ethanol production initially occurred in distilleries adjacent to
working sugar mills.47 This arrangement arose because the sugar industry
was already well established in Brazil.48 The industry had recently
modernized and expanded both because of the IAA’s programs, and
because excess sugar cane was available due to sugar prices decreasing
internationally.49
The ethanol era’s first phase ended with this stage of Proalcool’s
expansion. Growth slowed due to uncertainties caused by fluctuations in
international sugar prices and the auto industry’s doubts regarding the
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45

46
47

48

49

Id.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 70.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 16.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 16.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
Giuliano Guandalini and Chrystiane Silva, A Dupla Conquista, REVISTA VEJA (Feb. 2006),
http://veja.abril.com.br/010206/p_090.html.
Decreto No. 80.762/77, de 21 de Novembro de 1977, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 6
(Braz.).
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Vanessa M. Cordonnier, Ethanol’s Roots: How Brazilian Legislation Created the International
Ethanol Boom, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 287, 295 (2008).
Id. at 289 (noting that the sugar industry had been well established in Brazil since colonial
times).
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
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program’s viability.50 Nevertheless, in 1978, ethanol-fueled automobiles
debuted.51 Jobs and industry growth soon followed.52
B. SECOND PHASE: 1979–1986
In 1979, a new conflict in the Middle East—this time a war
between Iran and Iraq—contributed to oil prices escalating even further.
Prices exceeded US$30 a barrel.53 This price spike, known as the second
oil shock, initiated Proalcool’s second phase. Brazil’s government began
prioritizing production of hydrated ethanol for consumption due to the
recent development of motor vehicles fueled exclusively by ethanol.54
In 1979, the 1977 Decree was superseded by Decree n.
83.700/79, and major automobile manufacturers signed an agreement
with the Brazilian government setting massive production goals for
ethanol-fueled cars.55 Sugar cane production expanded and ethanol began
to be produced in autonomous distilleries.56 Proalcool’s production goal
increased to 10.7 billion liters by 1985, up from the 5.5 billion liters
previously set for 1980.57
Along with increasing production, the government also
implemented extraordinary measures to spur the purchase of ethanolonly vehicles.58 The idea was to overcome consumer reluctance and
distrust of the new car and fuel.59 A minimum blend of 20 percent
anhydrous ethanol was set for all gasoline consumed in the country,
installation of hydrated ethanol pumps in gas stations became
mandatory,60 taxes on industrialized products and motor vehicles were
reduced for ethanol-only engines,61 and ethanol-fueled taxis were granted
a tax exemption.62 Furthermore, the price of ethanol could not exceed 65

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

62

Id.
Id.
Id.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 73.
Id.
Cordonnier, supra note 47, at 298
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 73.
RODRIGUES supra note 14, at 17.
RODRIGUES supra note 14, at 18.
Cordonnier, supra note 47, at 298.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17.
Imposto sobre Produto Industrializado — IPI (Tax on Industrialized Products) and Taxa
Rodoviária Única (currently equivalent to IPVA).
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
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percent of the price of gasoline.63 In 1980, 28.5 percent of all motor
vehicles sold in Brazil were ethanol-only.64 By 1984, that percentage
increased to 88.5 percent.65
This second phase represented the peak of the biofuel program’s
expansion, as well as the beginning of its downfall. The Brazilian
government succeeded in establishing ethanol as a viable substitute for
fossil fuels. Its goals of ethanol production, consumption, and price
parity with gasoline had all been attained. However, in 1985 oil prices
stabilized and sugar prices and ethanol prices began to rise.66 As a result,
the economics of ethanol came into question.67 This resulted in reduced
investments in Proalcool from 1985 onward.
C. THIRD PHASE: 1986–2003
The third phase was marked by crisis. Proalcool’s mandatory and
subsidized nature guaranteed its initial success, but also condemned the
program to long-term unsustainability.68 In 1985, the military dictatorship
ended. The subsequent transition to democracy saw the government
begin to prioritize the need to control inflation and equalize the balance
of trade.69 In 1986, international oil prices decreased and stabilized, and
Brazil’s dependence on foreign oil decreased as the country began
relying more on domestic petroleum supplies.70 As a result, incentives to
expand ethanol production were cut and the government reduced
subsidies to existing ethanol plants.71
The decrease in federal support for ethanol revealed a dangerous
imbalance in the supply of and demand for the biofuel.72 The program
became discredited while high international sugar prices and lower
government incentives spurred the ethanol industry to turn to sugar
production.73 However, tax incentives for ethanol-fueled vehicles

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 75.
Id. at 80
Id.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17.
Id.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Id.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 80.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
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remained and ethanol prices dropped lower than gasoline prices.74 Thus,
even though production stagnated, ethanol consumption continued to
increase.75 By 1986, the volumes of ethanol and gasoline consumed in
Brazil were practically the same,76 and 90 percent of vehicles traded were
ethanol-only.77 This led to a critical crisis in supply. In 1989, Brazil
began importing ethanol.78
In 1990, the ethanol sector was deregulated and the once
powerful IAA was extinguished.79 By 1994, only 12.2 percent of motor
vehicles sold in Brazil were ethanol-only.80 This downturn reflected a
lack of consumer confidence, which in turn stemmed from hardships
faced by owners of ethanol-only vehicles during the supply crisis.81 In
1998, ethanol-only vehicle production was discontinued.82
Despite the halt in production, the legislature enacted an
important pro-ethanol law.83 Law n. 8.723/93 mandated reductions in
pollutants emitted by motor vehicles and established a mandatory blend
of 22 percent ethanol for all gasoline sold in Brazil.84 This represented an
important shift in the federal ethanol policy. For the first time, ethanol
production was incentivized for environmental rather than economic
reasons.85 This new law determining the mandatory blend was the main
reason why ethanol production continued in Brazil during the 1990s.86
Financial difficulties and the failure of governmental policies
during the 1990s resulted in the end of subsidies and government
incentives as well as the private sector’s efforts to revitalize and adapt
the industry to the new economic reality.87 The industry had to be

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

82
83

84
85

86
87

Id.
Id.
Id.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 79.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 80.
André Tosi Furtado & Mirna Ivone Gaya Scandiffio, A Promessa do Etanol no Brasil, VISAGES
D’AMÉRIQUE LATINE, no. 5, Sept. 2007, at 95, 97.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17.
Lei No. 8.723/93, de 28 de Outubro de 1993, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 9, de
29.10.1993 (Braz.) original redaction, before amended by Lei No. 10.203/01.
Id.,
HELINI SILVINI FERREIRA & JOSE RUBENS MORATO LEITE, BIOCOMBUSTIVEIS: FONTES DE
ENERGIA SUSTENTAVEL? CONSIDERACOES JURIDICAS, TECNICAS E ETICAS 126 – 27 (2010).
Id. at 126.
Luis Fernando Paulillo et al., Álcool combustível e biodiesel no Brasil - quo vadis, 45 REV.
ECON. SOCIOL. RURAL 531,542 (2007).
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modernized in order to maintain Brazilian ethanol’s competitiveness in
internal and external markets.88 Agriculture was mechanized, scientists
experimented with new variations of sugar cane, strategic mergers and
acquisitions were carried out, and mills and distilleries were
modernized.89 Many private institutions arose as well. For example,
Brasil Alcool (BA) and (Bolsa Brasileira de Alcool (BBA), which sought
to remedy the excess of ethanol in the market and attain better prices for
the product; while Uniao de Agroindustria Canavierira de Sao Paulo
(UNICA) and Associacao Paulista da Agronindustria Sucroalcooleira
(SUCROALCOOL), began to gather and represent a large part of the
industry in the country.90
The federal government also created a new agency, Agencia
Nacional do Petroleo (ANP), in 1997 to regulate and monitor the
exploitation, production, refinement, transportation, distribution, retail,
imports, and exports of oil, derivative substances, natural gas, and
ethanol.91 Finally, in 1999, ethanol prices became subject to free market
rules and were no longer set by the government.92
D. FOURTH PHASE: 2003–PRESENT
After its rise and fall, it seemed like Proalcool and the Brazilian
ethanol experience had failed. However, a new rise in international oil
prices, and increasing international awareness about climate change, as
well as the development of flex-fuel engines in Brazil, gave Brazilian
ethanol a new push. 93 The spike in oil prices caused by instability in the
Middle East revived the discussion about fossil fuel substitutes and
alternative energy sources.94 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol also called
attention to alternative energy sources, specifically regarding the need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.95 However, it was the development in
2003 of a commercially viable flex-fuel engine that could run on

88
89
90
91

92
93
94
95

Id. at 543
Id.
Michellon et al., supra note 25.
Lei No. 9.478/97, de 6 de Agosto de1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 07.08.1997
(Braz.).
Ministerio da Fazenda’s Portaria No. 64 (1996).
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Id.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4.
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gasoline, hydrated ethanol, or any blend of gasoline and anhydrous
ethanol that truly propelled ethanol back into dominance. 96
The Brazilian flex-fuel engine runs on any combination of
anhydrous ethanol and gasoline blend, as well as on pure hydrated
ethanol.97 By contrast, flex-fuel vehicles produced in other countries
operate on a blend of a maximum of 85 percent ethanol.98 Brazil’s flex
technology dissipated fears about the unavailability and price of ethanol
and gave Brazilian drivers the ability to fuel their vehicles with either
ethanol, gasoline, or both.99 For these reasons, the flex-fuel vehicle was a
big success, significantly increasing the national demand for ethanol.100
Flex-fuel vehicles became ubiquitous, with half of the 30,000 gas
stations in the country offering hydrated ethanol.101 By 2006, seven in
every ten vehicles sold in Brazil had flex-fuel engines.102
E. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
At present, there is no legal framework specifically aimed at
regulating ethanol in Brazil. Production and consumption is governed
primarily by the National Energy Policy (Law n. 9.478/97), under its
general regulation of biofuels.103 In the current regulatory landscape,
Agencia Nacional do Petroleo (“ANP”), the National Petroleum Agency,
is the main regulatory agency for any activity regarding biofuels.104 The
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Provisions (Ministerio da
Agricultura, Pecuaria e Abastecimento (“MAPA”), and the Interministry
Commission of Sugar and Ethanol (Comissao Interministerial do Acucar
e do Alcool, or “CIMA”) play strategic roles in defining the percentage
of the mandatory blend of ethanol to gasoline on federal land.105 Tax
incentives also form an important component of the regulatory
environment.
96
97

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
SUANI T. COELHO, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Feb. 7 – 9,
2005, Biofuels: Advantage and Trade Barriers, at 12, (Feb. 4, 2005).
Id.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Law No. 9.478/97, supra note 91.
Id.
Decreto No. 3.966/01, de 11 de Outubro de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 1, de
10.11.2001 (Braz.).
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The National Energy Policy (Law n. 9.478/97) was amended in
2005 by Law n. 11.097/05 to include biofuels in the national energy
matrix and to set the increment of biofuels production and use.106 In its
current form—shaped more recently through amendments introduced by
Law n. 12.490/11—the National Energy Policy aims to ensure a national
supply of biofuel, as well as to promote Brazil’s competitiveness in the
international biofuels market.107 The policy also incentivizes energy
generation from biomass and residues from biofuel production,
classifying them as complementary sources to hydroelectric energy.108
The policy expressly declares biofuels use to be part of the national
strategy to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to curb air
pollution from the transportation and energy sectors.109
Law n. 11.097/05 changed the ANP’s name from Agencia
Nacional do Petroleo (National Petroleum Agency) to Agencia Nacional
do Petroleo, Gas Natural e Biocombustiveis (National Agency of
Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels).110 Moreover, Law n. 11.909/09
and Law n. 12.490/11 added the regulation, authorization, and operative
oversight of any activity related to the production of biofuels to the
ANP’s jurisdiction,111 making it the regulatory agency most responsible
for biofuels activities in Brazil.
Law n. 8.723/93, which determined reductions in the amount of
air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, was amended once more in
2003.112 Law n. 10.696/03 kept the mandatory percentage of ethanol to be
blended with gasoline in the national territory at 22 percent but stipulated
that the president could elevate the percentage to a maximum of 25
percent or lower it to a minimum of 18 percent.113 In 2001, Presidential
Decree n. 3.966/01 delegated the power to elevate or lower the
mandatory percentage of ethanol to the Ministry of Agriculture,
Livestock and Provisions, following approval of the Inter-ministry
Commission of Sugar and Ethanol.114

106
107
108
109
110
111
112

113
114

Law No. 9.478/97, supra note 91.
Id. art. 1 (XIII & XV).
Id. art. 1 (XIV).
Id. art. 1 (XVIII).
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8 (VII & XVI).
Lei No. 10.696/03, de 2 de Julho de 2003, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 18, de
03.07.2003 (Braz.).
Lei No. 8.723/93, supra note 83, art. 9.
Decreto No. 3.966/01, supra note 105, art. 1.
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In 2007, MAPA Ordinance n. 143/2007 raised the mandatory
percentage in the blend to 25 percent.115 In 2010, MAPA Ordinance n.
07/2010 lowered the percentage to 20 percent for ninety days in the
beginning of 2010.116 Currently, the percentage is 20 percent, per MAPA
Ordinance n. 678/2011.117
In addition to the industry advantages created by the mandatory
blend, there also exist significant tax incentives for ethanol production in
Brazil.118 While there are four taxes on ethanol, the same four taxes are
charged on gasoline, but at much higher rates.119 Increasing gasoline
taxes indirectly incentivizes ethanol consumption and production.120 For
example, the rate of the Contribution on Intervention in the Economic
Domain (Contribuicao de Intervencao no Dominio Economico, or
“CIDE”) on the imports and internal sales of gasoline is R$860 per cubic
meter, while ethanol imports and internal sales are charged only R$37.20
per cubic meter.121 Clearly, ethanol users enjoy substantial savings.
While the government’s principal focus with respect to ethanol
involves incentivizing and regulating the production of ethanol for motor
vehicles, production for the energy sector is also implicated.122 Ethanol
producers may—if all legal requirements are fulfilled—use sugarcane
residue (bagasse) from their operations to generate energy, a measure
that is supported by the Incentive Program for Alternative Energy
Sources (Programa de Incentivo as Fontes Alternativas de Energia
Eletrica, or “PROINFA”).123 PROINFA was launched in 2002 by Law n.

115

116

117

118
119

120
121

122
123

Portaria No. 143/2007/MAPA, Article 1, de 29 de Junho de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] (Braz.).
Portaria No. 7/2010/MAPA, Article 1, de 12 de Janeiro de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] (Braz.).
Portaria No. 678/2011/MAPA, de 1 de Setembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
(Braz.).
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 126.
The Contribution on Intervention in the Economic Domain (Contribuicao de Intervencao no
Dominio Economico - CIDE), the Contribution to Programs of Social Integration and Building
of Public Servant’s Estate (Programas de Integracao Social e de Formacao do Patrimonio do
Servidor Publico — PIS/PASEP), the Contribution to the Financing of Social Security
(Contribuicao para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social — COFINS), and the Tax on the
Circulation of Goods and Services (Imposto sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias e Servicos —
ICMS).
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 126.
Lei No. 10.336/01, de 9 de Dezembro de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 1, de
20.12.2001 (Braz.).
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 126.
Law No. 10.438/02, de 26 de Abril de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 29.04.2002
(Braz.).
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10.438/02, and was intended to increase the participation of alternative
energy sources in the national system of energy production and
transmission (Sistema Elétrico Interligado Nacional, or “SIN”).124 The
program was divided into two phases. Phase 1 had an initial goal of
generating 3,300 megawatts (MW) of energy from those renewable
sources contemplated by the program (wind, small hydroelectric projects,
and biomass) by 2008.125 Phase 2 sought to achieve an even more
ambitious goal: to make possible that in twenty years’ time, 10 percent of
all energy consumed in the country would derive from projects affiliated
with PROINFA.126 According to the Brazilian government, Phase 1 was
implemented successfully, with the generation of 3.299,40 MW of
energy from alternative sources.127 However, some critics argue that
Phase 1 was never actually implemented—contracts were signed, but
many projects did not generate energy due to various problems.128 Phase
2 seems to have been abandoned, with no apparent effort or planning
from the government for its realization.129
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Ethanol development has helped Brazil overcome a historical
dependency on foreign oil, allowing it to completely cease oil imports.130
This wholesale integration of ethanol has enabled the most successful
alternative to fossil fuels for transportation currently known.131 The
initiative is also an important part of a national effort to curtail
greenhouse gas emissions and diminish air pollution from motor
vehicles.
Ethanol supporters maintain that ethanol offers significant
environmental advantages over fossil fuels.132 They argue that planting
124
125
126
127
128

129
130

131
132

Id. art. 3
Id. art. 3(I)(a).
Id. art. 3(I)(b).
Profina, MINISTERIO DE MINAS E ENERGIA, http://www.mme.gov.br/programas/proinfa.
Adeus
Profina,
BRAZIL
ENERGIA
(Feb.
2,
2010),
http://www.energiahoje.com/brasilenergia/noticiario/2010/02/02/403330/adeus-proinfa-2.html.
Id.
The exploitation of the country’s vast oil resources had a significant role in this process. In 2006,
with the inauguration of Petrobras’ platform P-50, Brazil achieved oil independence — the
national oil supply became available in sufficient quantities to meet the internal demand. Lula
anuncia auto-suficiência do Brasil em petróleo amanhã, FOLHA ONLINE, (Apr. 20, 2006),
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u107023.shtml.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14.
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sugarcane absorbs carbon dioxide from the air and, as a result, carbon
dioxide released when ethanol is burned does not contribute to net
greenhouse gas emissions.133 They also maintain that ethanol is nontoxic
and biodegradable and burns cleaner than gasoline,134 thus improving
local air quality.135 These claims have come under increased scrutiny in
recent years.136
Critics argue that large-scale ethanol production raises food
prices and strains food supplies due to the diversion of agricultural
resources to produce fuel instead of food.137 They note that the United
States has experienced higher food prices due to its ramping-up of corn
ethanol production.138 However, Brazil has produced ethanol (from
sugar) in gradually increasing volumes for more than thirty-five years
without experiencing such effect.139
A possible answer as to why food prices have not risen in Brazil
is that there are still vast areas available for planting other crops.140 There
are 355 million hectares in Brazil suitable for agricultural activities.141 Of
those 355 million hectares, only 90 million are appropriate for planting
sugarcane, and only 7.2 million hectares are actually under plow.142 Half
of that total is dedicated to sugar production, not ethanol.143 Thus,
theoretically there are 77 million hectares available and suitable for
sugarcane cultivation in Brazil without putting pressure on the spaces
dedicated to other crops.144
Another criticism of the ethanol industry is that increased
demand for ethanol forces farming expansion, which in turn leads to
conversion of protected areas to agricultural uses.145 This potential poses
a special concern for Brazil because of the threat of encroachment of

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

141
142
143
144
145

Id.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 15.
Id.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Biocombustiveis
e
alimentos,
REVISTA
VEJA
(Apr.
2008),
http://veja.abril.com.br/idade/exclusivo/perguntas_respostas/biocombustiveis_alimentos/index.sh
tml.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 12.
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sugarcane plantations into the Amazon region.146 However, the threat to
the Amazon may be overstated.147 The Amazon climate is not ideal for
sugarcane cultivation.148 Consequently, ethanol production is unlikely to
expand into the region, particularly with so much other suitable land
available elsewhere. In addition, technological improvements have
boosted ethanol productivity.149
Still, there remains a very real indirect threat to the Amazon.
Higher demand for ethanol could force people and industries displaced
by sugar to move to the Amazon.150 This would create the same result
(increased deforestation) as the expansion of sugar cultivation into the
region.151 To protect against such eventualities, Brazil has enacted very
strict limits regarding how much land in the Amazon—and every other
rural region of the country—can be used for any activity other than
sustainable management of the native forest or vegetation.152 The Forest
Code (Law n. 12.651/12) establishes a percentage of native forest or
vegetation that must be kept in every rural property in the country.153 The
percentage varies depending on the region and native vegetation. For the
Amazon, 80 percent of the property must be covered with the native
forest, and for those in “cerrado”154 areas of the Amazon region, the
percentage is 35 percent.155 For properties in any other forest or native
vegetation area in Brazil, 20 percent of the property must be covered
with native species; and for any other rural property in Brazil, 20 percent
of the possession must preserve whatever original vegetation exists in the
area.156
Consequently, the law restricts the amount of land that can be
converted to sugarcane or any other crop due to increasing ethanol
demand. In the Amazon, for example, only 20 percent of any rural
property can have the original forest suppressed in order to plant

146
147
148
149
150
151

152

153
154
155
156

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
See Daniel A. Farber, Indirect Land Use Change, Uncertainty, and Biofuels Policy, U. ILL. L.
REV. 381, 389 (2011).
Lei No. 12.651/12, de 25 de Maio de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 12, de
28.05.2012 (Braz.).
Id.
Vegetation of the Brazilian interior.
Law No. 12.651/12, supra note 152, art. 12(I)(b)
Id. art. 12(II).
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sugarcane. 157 However, enforcement of these laws presents significant
challenges, especially in the Amazon, where the vastness of the area and
the difficulties of accessing remote areas pose significant obstacles to the
effectiveness of the Forest Code.
Thus, although the criticism that a high demand for ethanol will
force agricultural expansion into protected areas is not wholly accurate in
the Brazilian case, inadequate enforcement means that threats to
protected areas by agricultural interests do indeed exist. Ethanol critics
also argue that using ethanol for transportation may result in more
greenhouse gas emissions than using oil because more energy from fossil
fuels gets used in the production and distribution of ethanol than the
biofuel could actually generate.158 This criticism has substantial merit.
Depending on the production method and the source plant, greenhouse
benefits of ethanol vary greatly.159 In the case of Brazilian ethanol,
however, the balance on a well-to-wheels basis—from the extraction of
the fuel used in agriculture to combustion in a motor vehicle—is
positive; it results in significant reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions.160 Hydrated and anhydrous ethanol consumption by motor
vehicles in Brazil generated substantially less greenhouse gas emissions
from the national fleet than if pure gasoline had been the only fuel used.
For example, from 1990 to 1994, avoided carbon dioxide emissions161
totaled between 42 percent and 46 percent162 of the potential carbon
dioxide emissions.163 During the same period, avoided emissions from
other greenhouse gases were also significant, varying from 6 percent to
17 percent in comparison with hypothetical emissions.164 These savings
resulted in substantial part from the fact that most sugarcane mills in the
157
158
159
160
161

162
163

164

Id. art. 12(I)(a).
Farber, supra note 152, at 385 – 86.
Id.
Id.
The avoided emissions are defined as the difference between the emissions from a hypothetic
scenario where the national fleet consumes only pure gasoline, and the emissions from the actual
scenario, where the fleet is formed by vehicles consuming a blend of gasoline and anhydrous
ethanol as well as hydrated ethanol. MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E DA TECNOLOGIA, Primeiro
Inventário Brasileiro de Emissões Antrópicas de Gases Efeito Estufa — Relatórios de Referência
— Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa por Fontes Móveis, no Setor Energético 39 (2006),
available at http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0008/8848.pdf (First Brazilian Inventory of
Anthropic Greenhouse Gases Emissions — Reference Reports — Greenhouse Gases Emissions
from Mobile Sources of the Energy Sector).
Id. at 40.
The hypothetic emissions are defined as those resulting from a hypothetic scenario where the
entire national fleet consumed only pure gasoline. Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
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country are self-suff
ufficient in energy generation. Sugarcane bagasse is
used to generate thee eenergy necessary to the production process.165
In 2008, the OECD issued a study comparing the amount of
greenhouse gases em
emitted during the lifecycle of different biofuel source
ce
plants.166 Sugarcanee ethanol resulted in an average of 85 percent less
ss
emissions than gasoli
oline, and even 100 percent in cases where mills used
ed
crop residues to gen
generate the electricity to power the operation.167 In
comparison, ethanol
ol from wheat provides reductions between 30 percent
nt
and 50 percent, andd ethanol from corn yields an average of 20 percent
nt
less emissions.168
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COELHO, supra note 97,
7, aat 18
ADRIANO PIRES & RAFAE
AEL SCHECHTMAN, ETANOL E BIOELETRICIDADE: A CANA-DE-ACUCAR NO
O
FUTURO DA MATRIZ ENE
NERGETICA 196 (2010) ( considering different technologies that can be
used in production and di
did not consider possible changes in land use).
Id.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES?
The development of ethanol in Brazil has helped the country
overcome a historical dependence on foreign oil while curbing its
greenhouse gases emissions and diminishing local air pollution. After the
supply crisis and the price volatility made ethanol an unreliable choice
for the Brazilian consumer toward the end of the 1980s and throughout
the 1990s,169 high international oil prices in the 2000s remade it an
attractive option once again.170 Perhaps the single most important factor
in the resurgence of the ethanol sector was the development of flex-fuel
technology, which permitted Brazilian consumers to fuel their vehicles
with ethanol or gasoline every time they go to a gas station.171 That
freedom of choice eased the volatility of the market and provided
consumers with the certainty that they could always choose the least
expensive fuel alternative.
Most of the prevailing critiques of the ethanol sector regarding
environmental issues do not apply in the Brazilian case, primarily
because of the peculiarities of sugarcane ethanol production in the
country.172 The overall success of Brazil’s ethanol program has resulted
in calls for its replication abroad, including in the United States.
However, reproducing Brazil’s ethanol success in the United States
would be virtually impossible.
First, the Brazilian option to heavily invest in ethanol was made
during a military dictatorship.173 No dissent was permitted, and
consequently, prices could be manipulated and a high degree of
governmental intervention tolerated. Ethanol prices were controlled,
ethanol pumps were mandatorily installed, Petrobras was obliged to buy
169
170
171
172
173

Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Id.
Id.
Biocombustiveis e alimentos, supra note 140.
Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 70.
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a percentage of the production, etc. 174 These measures would not only be
impossible to implement in a democratic system such as the one in the
United States, they would also likely fail under the current Brazilian
democratic regime.
Second, the United States lacks the infrastructure and the market
for widespread ethanol consumption in motor vehicles. The facts that
most gas stations in Brazil have pumps for hydrated ethanol and that
most people own flex-fuel vehicles are key to the success of Brazilian
ethanol.175 In the United States, gas stations would likely be very
reluctant to install hydrated ethanol pumps until demand existed.
Consumers, on the other hand, would be deterred from investing in flexfuel vehicles until there was infrastructure in place with which to
purchase flex fuel. The ensuing stalemate creates an environment where
the rapid growth of a flex fuel vehicle market becomes highly unlikely.
Third, and most importantly, Brazil produces ethanol from
sugarcane, while the United States produces ethanol from corn.176
Ethanol from sugarcane is cheaper and more energy efficient than corn
ethanol, and its mass production does not cause the same impact on food
markets in Brazil as ethanol from corn did and does in the United
States.177
Corn ethanol is also more expensive to produce than both
gasoline and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol.178 The low cost of sugarcane
ethanol production allows Brazilian ethanol to compete with gasoline
without the substantial subsidies used until recently179 by the United
States to make corn ethanol competitive.180
Corn ethanol production is also energy-intensive.181It may
require more energy to produce and distribute then it is capable of
generating.182 This significantly diminishes the possible greenhouse gas
174
175
176
177
178

179

180

181
182

Id. at 74.
Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.
Biocombustiveis e alimentos, supra note 140.
PIRES & SCHECHTMAN, supra note 166, at 196.
Nancy I. Potter, How Brazil Achieved Energy Independence and the Lessons the United States
Should Learn from Brazil’s Experience, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 331, 348 (2008).
Robert Pear, After Three Decades Tax Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at
A.
It is worth noting that U.S. sugar growers have not yet seriously tried to produce ethanol because
the highly controlled U.S. Sugar Import Program makes raw sugar prices more advantageous.
See David Adams, Sugar in the Tank, FORBES.COM (Nov. 16, 2005),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/15/energy-ethanol-brazil_cx_1116energy_adams.html.
Farber, supra note 151, at 385 – 86.
Id. at 385.

CASSUTO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

498

2/12/2013 8:26 AM

Wisconsin International Law Journal

emissions benefits.183 By contrast, sugarcane ethanol results in an average
of 85 percent less emissions than gasoline, and can reach 100 percent in
cases where mills are energy self-sufficient.184 Furthermore, corn is a
“major food crop” and livestock food,185 and most usable farmland in the
United States is already in production.186 Consequently, any substantial
diversion of corn to ethanol production will almost certainly affect food
prices.187 Brazil, on the other hand, has vast lands available and suitable
for planting sugarcane without displacing other crops. For all of these
reasons, if the United States were to pursue ethanol as a substitute for
gasoline on the same scale as Brazil did, and if it were to do so with an
eye toward real environmental gains and minimizing impacts on the food
supply, it would have to seek source plants other than corn.
There are other alternative feed sources for ethanol under
study.188 The most promising of these is cellulosic ethanol.189 Cellulosic
ethanol is produced by breaking down cellulose in woody fibers such as
trees, grasses, and crop wastes.190 These sources require less energy,
fertilizer, water, and can also be cultivated on lands not appropriate for
growing food.191 However none of these cellulosic ethanol alternatives
are yet commercially viable.192
In sum, the hard lesson for the United States to learn from the
Brazilian model is that while the results are worthy of emulation, the
methods of achieving it were unique. Thus, the methods used in Brazil
are not necessarily desirable and the results are simply not replicable
here.
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PIRES & SCHECHTMAN, supra note 166, at 206.
Id. at 196.
Farber, supra note 151, at 383.
Potter, supra note 178, at 347.
Pear, supra note 179.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 15.
RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 7.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 8
Id.
Andy Parris, Light Vehicle Alternative Fuels and Fuel Economy Related Technologies, INT’L
TRADE
ADMIN.
3
(Sept.
10,
2009),
available
at
www.trade.gov/mas/manufacturing/oaai/. . ./tg_oaai_003663.pdf.

